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Professor Jacopo Martire’s book, A Foucauldian Interpretation of Modern Law. From 
Sovereignty to Normalisation and Beyond, deserves careful attention. The book represents 
the author’s project of making Foucault’s thought compatible with modern legal theory. 
Dr. Martire (from the University of Bristol) tries to put together and reconcile two 
seemingly incompatible approaches to understanding the workings of modern society. 
Jürgen Habermas’s forceful critique of Foucault still looms large. Other traditional 
interpretations of Foucault’s work have emphasized “the expulsion thesis,” that is, the 
fact that Foucault, relying too much on discipline and governmentality, effectively 
expelled law from the locus of power and excessively downplayed the role of law in our 
times. 
Martire’s project is a recent attempt at reconciling Foucault and legal theory. The 
author devotes some attention to previous efforts, from Rose & Valverde to Golder & 
Fitzpatrick (pp. 9-21), and highlights what he sees as the shortcomings of such efforts. 
Martire’s project forcefully contributes to overcoming such interpretations with a 
powerful work where he operates a logical and genealogical alignment of Foucault and 
modern law by postulating at the outset that power and freedom are “co-extensive” rather 
than opposite. This Foucauldian insight (originating in Nietzsche) is one of the core ideas 
of the book and one of the keys to understanding this book’s project.  
Consequently, Martire postulates that “law and modern (biopolitical) regimes of 
power are not to be seen as incompatible or heterogeneous” […] “they both evolved 
isomorphically as normalizing technologies of government of the living, and exist in a 
relationship of co-production: law creates the universal subject of rights, who is reflected 
in the normal subject of biopolitical regimes, and viceversa” (p. 3). 
In order to avoid a characterization of the legal field that would fall prey to the 
expulsion thesis, Martire proposes to approach Foucault’s theoretical toolbox by 
highlighting the complex intertwining of power, truth, knowledge, subjectivity and 
freedom.  In Foucault, these terms are not “concepts” that can be neatly defined and 
separated from one another but rather overlapping fields (my term, not Martire’s) in an 
epistemological sense.  
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Taken together, these terms constitute an epistemological regime, a logical relational 
(again, my term) ensemble to be attributed to complex strategic situations, that allows an 
understanding of modern society’s conditions of possibility. Martire also focus on a 
discussion of Foucault’s legal texts – his Rio and Louvain lectures (p. 21). 
“Law,” according to Martire, “should be studied as a sui generis apparatus which, 
working along the lines of jurisdiction/veridiction, inscribes subjectivity within a triangle 
formed by power, knowledge and truth” (p. 27). Law is that particular apparatus which, 
in modernity, establishes the political truth of the subject by making visible her interests.  
Normalization did not make law a relic of the past; law adopted the underlying logic of 
contemporary biopolitical regimes (which for Foucault are normalizing). Under 
normalization, law ceased to be only a sign of power and became the general discourse of 
power in modern societies (p. 29), institutionalized in the State, and characterized by 
generality, abstraction, equality and freedom (p. 33). 
Chapter two offers a genealogical analysis of law as an apparatus  that makes visible 
the political truth of the individual by analyzing key philosophers (Aquinas, Bodin, 
Grotius, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel). The chapter is devoted to the 
formation, in the history of political theory, of the idea of political legitimation, and how 
this idea gradually abandoned its metaphysical foundations and “was gradually 
conceived in a secular way focusing on individual interests seen through the prism of the 
paradigm of the norm and the dynamics of normalization” (p. 37). Law slowly ceased to 
be conceived as a set of commands issued by a supreme sovereign to become chiefly a 
body of worldly norms generated by the individuals themselves. 
In chapter three, Dr. Martire discusses law as an apparatus that makes visible the 
political truth of society by scrutinizing the British (p. 77-84), American (p. 84-90) and 
French (p. 91-101) revolutions. These are the key historical events and discursive practices 
that led to the emergence of the “constitutional horizon of modernity” (p. 72) that establish 
that governments should have powers limited by laws. By focusing on the three 
revolutions, Martire shows how “the modern legal discourse embraced the paradigm of 
the norm and how the relationship between law, society, power and truth was reshaped” 
through these events (p. 73). The author’s ideal-typical reconstruction highlights the fact 
that each revolution had to face a different system of legal absolutism; generality, 
abstraction, equality and freedom only appear in full in the French revolution. Each 
revolution, however, contributed to the building of a system “that not only limits power 
under the paradigm of the norm but, most importantly, makes power manifest through 
the paradigm of the norm” (p. 102). 
Chapter four analyzes how “modern law and apparatuses of normalization form a 
coherent self-feeding assemblage which, through a dynamic of co-production, inscribes 
the subject within an isomorphic space where the paradigm of the norm dominates both 
the legal and the socio-scientific dimension” (p. 35). The chapter offers (1) a detailed 
account of the generative syntax of modern law by showing its normalizing effects of 
subjectivation (pp. 106-113); and (2) a discussion of the relationship between the discourse 
of modern law and other apparatuses of subjectivation (pp. 113-119). 
REVIEW 
Foucault Studies, No. 26, p. 111-114    113 
 
Also in chapter four, and following Bauman’s idea of  “liquid modernity” (and, 
implicitly, non-representational theory as posited by Nigel Thrift and others), Dr. Martire 
characterizes the individual increasingly as a “virtual entity” which is at odds with the 
normalizing paradigm that informs modern law; “otherness,” according to the author, 
has started to progressively erode the image of commonality upon which universalistic 
claims of liberal legalism rest (pp. 119-125). Martire states the intriguing claim (pp. 126-
134) that the emergence of control societies has brought us to the absolute limit of the 
normalizing complex; the vision of the subject as a virtual entity “indicates a growing 
awareness of the presence of an existential uniqueness, otherness, in everyone’s life that 
challenges the attempts at conceiving the social body in terms of normality” (p. 105). 
Whereas “modern law makes possible the workings of discipline/governmentality by 
prohibiting social divisions and creating universal subjects upon which biopolitical 
strategies can be effectively enforced,” and whereas “discipline/governmentality 
constantly recodify the subject in a standardized fashion, thus concretely producing a 
normalized population which can be reflected in the universality of law” (p. 105), the 
current situation is one of blockage in legal thinking. The “normative and functional crisis 
of modern law” (pp. 134-140) means that “if it does not make sense, to use universal laws 
to regulate a radically xenomorphic social body, then also normatively there is no appeal 
in subjecting all to universal laws, since subjecting the Xenos (the Other, the alien) to 
universal categories means unjustly constraining her into a set to which she does not 
belong” (p. 140). 
In the conclusions chapter, Martire contends that defenders (Habermas and Held, p. 
142-151) and critics (Butler and Golder, pp. 152-160) of liberalism fail to understand the 
extent of the inherent and inescapable normalizing effects that modern law imposes on 
the subject, and thus are unable to offer viable solutions to the normative and functional 
crisis that modern law is suffering in the face of an increasingly liquid, non-normalizable 
social body. A Foucauldian approach to law (as perhaps the quintessential heterotopic 
space) offers a way forward to the structural discursive limits of modern law. The politics 
of law is increasingly questioned but the syntax of law, and its changing relationship with 
changing biopolitical forms of power, is left untouched. Focusing on rights (as Golder 
does in his recent book) misses the point, Martire argues.  
The author concludes that there is no way out of the blockage in legal theory that he 
has identified. However, he believes that his genealogical study of law as a sui generis 
apparatus and his critique of the structural limits of modern law provide a problematic 
point for redefining the contours of our legal landscape. The problem to be addressed is 
stated as follows: 
We need to imagine a way forward that breaks with our normalizing/representative 
legal discourse and addresses in a fresh and truly original way the problem of regulating 
a liquid society of virtual subjects.  How can we restructure the syntax of law? How can 
we find ways out of the normalizing system in which modern law has been articulated? 
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How can law become an instrument capable of coping with the fluid demands of new 
biopolitical dynamics? (p. 162) 
 
 
If “normalization” is exhausted, what would be the main features of the new syntax of 
law that Martire advocates? A few pages venturing into this territory would have been 
well received by readers. For example, would such a project need to include the Xenos of 
increasingly dominant non-Western societies such as India and China and their legal 
traditions?  
 
A Foucauldian Interpretation of Modern Law offers a rigorous genealogical analysis of the 
evolution of legal theory and is largely successful in reinterpreting modern law according 
to Foucauldian normalization. In addition, this book poses very relevant questions about 
the adequacy of contemporary legal theory that will be at the forefront of upcoming 
debates and discussions in the field.  
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